D.C. Superior Court Opinions

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E.g., June 20, 2018
E.g., June 20, 2018
Format: XXX-DWLR-XXXX
  • D.C. Superior Court

    Family Law

    Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act / Fundamental Principles of Human Rights / Personal Jurisdiction / Uniform Interstate Family Support Act / Child Support / Spousal Support / D.C. Long Arm Statute / Minimum Contacts / Equitable Division of Marital Property

     

    In a divorce case where one party lives in the District of Columbia and the other in Pakistan, the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for child support but not for spousal support or the equitable division of marital property. The District of Columbia has jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as the minor children lived there for more than six months before proceedings commenced. Family court in Karachi, Pakistan has jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA since the children lived there prior to coming to the United States, have family in Karachi, and there is no evidence they would move to another jurisdiction. Pakistani custody law violates fundamental human rights by discriminating against women in child custody proceedings. Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant under subsection (5) of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) for the purposes of child support because his abusive behavior led Plaintiff to move with their children to the District. Court lacks personal jurisdiction for spousal support claims. The D.C. long arm statute does not confer jurisdiction since the facts and circumstances related to the claim occurred in Pakistan. UIFSA does not confer jurisdiction since Defendant was served in Pakistan and has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction. Defendant has not had minimum contacts with the District necessary to satisfy due process. Defendant “has never resided, resided, conducted business, or owned property in the District of Columbia.” Defendant did not avail himself of the benefits and protections of the District when contacting the police to ascertain the welfare of his children. Defendant’s acceptance of Plaintiff and their children moving to the District is not an implied consent to jurisdiction. Motion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part.

  • D.C. Superior Court

    Civil Procedure

    Substitution of a Party Plaintiff / Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c) / Standing / Revival of Judgment

     

    Substitution of party plaintiff and grant of motion to revive judgment was error. Defendants have standing to oppose any motions by a plaintiff, including a motion to revive judgment. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC never filed a motion to substitute party plaintiff as required by Superior Court Rule 25(c). Since Palisades has not demonstrated an interest in the judgment, grant of its motion to revive judgment was error. Reversed and vacated.

  • D.C. Superior Court
    Family Law
    Custody with a Non-Parent / Parental Presumption / Safe and Stable Homes for Children and Youth Amendment Act of 2007 / “Living With” / Exceptional Circumstances / Child’s Best Interest
    Plaintiff, the grandfather of a minor child, has successfully rebutted the parental presumption and it is in the child’s best interest to be in Plaintiff’s custody rather than the child’s mother’s, the Defendant. Plaintiff has standing since the minor child was living with him when he filed the complaint and exceptional circumstances, namely the upcoming school year and Defendant’s possible eviction, existed at the time. Plaintiff has successfully rebutted the parental presumption because the minor child’s father has effectively abandoned the child. Defendant is currently unfit since she “has failed to maintain contact with, nurture and support the child,” cannot provide a safe and stable home at this time, is unable to meet the child’s special needs, and her untreated mental health conditions have hindered her ability to provide care. Evidence demonstrates that custody with Defendant is “detrimental to the minor child’s physical and emotional well-being.” Custody with Plaintiff is in the child’s best interest.

  • D.C. Superior Court

    Criminal Law

    Search Warrant / Non-Disclosure Order / First Amendment / Fourth Amendment / Superior Court Criminal Rule 41 (e)(2) / Electronic Search

     

    In a criminal prosecution arising from arrests at protests during the presidential inauguration, government’s motion to show cause to compel Facebook to turn over information about accounts and pages is granted. Since any evidence will be co-mingled with personal information and other material implicating First Amendment rights, procedural safeguards are appropriate to preserve First and Fourth Amendment freedoms. Account holders’ request for limited intervention is denied. Since Facebook has not yet produced the evidence sought in the warrants, the account holders have not yet been aggrieved and do not have authority under Superior Court Criminal Rule 41 (e)(2) to challenge them. 

  • D.C. Superior Court

    Family Law

    Child Custody / Testimony from the Child and Family Services Agency / Subpoena / Confidentiality / D.C. Code § 4-1303.06(a) / Baby Broker Act

     

    In a child custody case, testimony from a social worker from the Child and Family Services Agency is not precluded by statutory confidentiality provisions. Requested disclosure meets the “purpose relating to the identification of abuse and neglect” exception of D.C. Code § 4-1303.06(a) and testimony will assist the Court identify service needs and require treatment if necessary. The Baby Broker Act, D.C. Code § 4-1405, was never intended to apply to the Child and Family Services Agency, so its statutory confidentiality provisions are inapplicable. Motion to quash denied.

  • D.C. Superior Court

    Family Law

    Common Law Marriage / Legal Separation

     

    Plaintiff has not established by clear and convincing evidence or a preponderance of the evidence that the parties were in a common law marriage. Parties did not enter into an express mutual agreement to be married. Neither party remembered the date they were allegedly married. Neither party subsequently told friends or family members that they were married. The parties did not inscribe and exchange rings, as they had discussed doing to commemorate their marriage. The parties maintained separate finances. Plaintiff did not object when Defendant told him that he intended to marry someone else. Complaint for legal separation dismissed.

  • D.C. Superior Court

    Civil Protective Order 

    Interfamily Offenses Act / Stalking / First Amendment

     

    City Council member has not alleged two instances of stalking, as required under D.C. Code § 22-3133 (a), against a journalist and therefore cannot receive a civil protected order. Forty-seven text messages sent in a single night, many consisting of personal attacks, are not speech protected under the First Amendment and constitute a basis for stalking. Posts on a Facebook page created as a forum to discuss matters of community interest is protected First Amendment speech and cannot form a basis for stalking. Aggressive questioning at a public community forum is protected by the First Amendment. Going to Petitioner’s house to photograph his car to investigate any parking tickets related to a proposal before the Council pertained to a matter of public concern as is therefore protected speech and does not form a basis for stalking. Request for a civil protective order denied.

  • D.C. Superior Court

    Family Law

    Reunification / Abuse of Discretion / Magistrate Judge’s Ruling / Permanency Goal / Neglect

     

    In a child neglect and abuse case, magistrate judge’s denial of request to change the permanency goal from reunification to adoption was error. Magistrate judge’s conclusion that the government had not proved that the presumption in favor reunification had been rebutted was abuse of discretion. Magistrate’s findings of fact demonstrate that the presumption had been rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. Trial court’s findings demonstrated that the reunification plan was reasonable. Case plans were tailored to meet concerns and the biological mother had notice of the plan and steps required for reunification. Record demonstrates that Child and Family Services Agency made reasonable efforts to ameliorate the conditions that led to the adjudication of neglect. Social workers provided the biological mother with contact information for therapeutic services, SmartTrip cards so she could attend therapy sessions, and repeatedly met with her to discuss her behavior and progress. Trial court abused discretion when relying on a judicially-noticed previous order to conclude that the government failed to prove the biological mother did not make adequate progress. Magistrate’s conclusion that the goal change from reunification to adoption was inappropriate was an abuse of discretion. Factual findings supported a goal change and the government’s evidence satisfied the preponderance of evidence standard. Magistrate’s failure to make conclusions of law about the biological father was not an abuse of discretion. Reunification with the father was never the goal and the father never participated in the proceedings. Denial of request to change permanency goal from reunification to adoption vacated and reversed and magistrate’s judgment modified in part.  

  • D.C. Superior Court

    Employment Law

    D.C. Human Rights Act / Retaliation / Gender Discrimination / Discrimination Based on Family Responsibilities / Adverse Action

     

    In an employment suit against a local news station, Plaintiff has failed to meet the prima facie showing required to support her claims for gender discrimination, gender retaliation, and family responsibility discrimination and retaliation. Changing Plaintiff’s schedule to include working on weekend days, causing her to use paid vacation time to avoid working Saturdays, is not an adverse action. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant changed the terms of her employment, nor was she reprimanded due to her request for a different schedule. While Petitioner was the only full-time female anchor at the news station, she has not otherwise provided factual support for her allegations that the working environment was a “boys club.” Plaintiff did not complain about the schedule that allegedly privileged male employees until after the allegedly retaliatory activity had occurred. The D.C. Human Rights Act does not require employers to schedule employees in ways that allow them to attend school functions and otherwise spend time with their families. Motion to dismiss granted.

  • D.C. Superior Court

    Probate Law

    Withdrawal of Life Support / Guardian ad Litem / Substituted Judgment Standard / Best Interests Inquiry

     

    When an incapacitated person’s wishes regarding end-of-life care are unclear, the “best interests” inquiry is the appropriate approach to take regarding the “substituted judgment” standard as applied to withdrawal of life support. Decisionmakers should consider objective factors to determine what course of treatment is in the incapacitated person’s best interests. The Court considers the patient’s pattern of conduct regarding prior treatment decisions, religious beliefs, extent of mental and physical disability, prognosis, capacity for pleasure and pain, degree of humiliation and dependency, the probable side effects of continued treatment, and the views of family members. Here, the patient repeatedly refused treatment for a substance abuse problem, there is no evidence that her religious beliefs were opposed to withdrawal of life support, patient had no brain activity or response to stimuli, patient’s prognosis was terminal and irreversible, patient enjoyed no “quality of life,” patient was totally dependent on others for her bodily functions, continued treatment would lead to ulcers and cardiac arrest, and patient’s adult children support withdrawal from life support. Petition for consent to withdrawal of life support granted. 

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